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Abstract 
 
Forming a coalition involves compromise, so a prime minister heading up a coalition 
government, even one as predominant a party leader as Cameron, should not be as 
powerful as a prime minister leading a single party government. Cameron has still to 
work with and through ministers from his own party, but has also to work with and 
through Liberal Democrat ministers; not least the Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg. 
The relationship between the prime minister and his deputy is unchartered territory for 
recent academic study of the British prime minister. This article explores how Cameron 
and Clegg operate within both Whitehall and Westminster: the cabinet arrangements; the 
prime minister’s patronage, advisory resources and more informal mechanisms. 
Cameron and Clegg both possess institutional and personal resources, but Cameron 
remains the predominant resource-rich actor, so at this early stage in the coalition 
government we can observe that no formal, substantial change in the role of prime 
minister has been enacted. Cameron’s predominance, by leading a coalition, is partially 
constrained by Clegg, but he too constrains Clegg. This prime minister, then, can be 
predominant even when he is constrained in significant ways by the imperatives of 
coalition government. Cameron is presently no more constrained than a prime minister 
who is faced with a preeminent intra-party rival with a significant power base. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
David Cameron is not, thanks to the Conservatives’ failure to win the last election 
outright, the party leader with a party majority in the House of Commons. He is, contrary 
to the manner prescribed by postwar tradition, only prime minister because the 
Conservatives formed a coalition with the third placed Liberal Democrats. No party 
leader in modern times has become prime minister by his party combining with another; a 
single party government, even in the hung parliament of February to October 1974, has 
long been the principal foundation for the prime minister. Cameron is prime minister 
alongside the formal deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg. To be an effective prime 
minister he has to manage as well as work with and through (perhaps sometimes appease) 
senior Conservative ministers and his own backbenches. Most unusually he has also, to 
work with and carefully manage both Clegg and the Liberal Democrat party. The 
established image of a strong, authoritative prime minister leading the government from 
the front is an image popularly associated with being Britain’s parliamentary chief 
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executive. Is being prime minister radically different when leading a coalition 
government instead of a single party one? 
 
Intra executive politics within the coalition 
 
Executive- legislative relations remain (so far) spectacularly unchanged under the 
coalition, thanks to the preparedness of the Conservative- Liberal Democrat Commons 
majority to prioritise supplying and supporting the government over checking and 
balancing it. The government’s parliamentary majority remains, as ever, the keystone in 
the government’s arch so, even with this government being dependant on a majority 
composed of two different and distinct political parties (with no national experience of 
working together), ministers still lead and the Commons (largely) follows 
(notwithstanding the fact that minority elements in both parties have been willing to 
rebel). It is, however, in the emergent relationship between both coalition partners within 
the government where British politics has entered hitherto unchartered territory: there 
have been some small, subtle (and perhaps far reaching) changes enacted in intra-
executive relationships. Such changes, inevitably, manifest themselves in changes in the 
role played by the prime minister.  
 
It is worth noting at the outset that the task of exploring how Cameron (and Clegg’s) 
government ‘works’ is complicated by the fact that it rarely leaks or briefs about 
‘process’ (process being ‘how’ ministers work, not just what they do). Labour endlessly, 
tirelessly did so as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s battles for ascendancy, exacerbated 
by their eager camp followers (Rawnsely 2010, 2001; Blair 2010; Mandelson 2010), were 
ceaselessly reported to the news media. Reporters presently ask questions, but insiders, 
ministers and special advisers alike, largely refuse to provide answers. In terms of 
understanding how the government operates, the coalition awaits its own Andrew 
Rawnsley; we are presently very much on the outside looking in. 
 
The Cameron-Clegg relationship 
 
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have made substantive policy 
concessions to the other; neither can insist on any policy the other cannot accept, so both 
observe a ‘self denying ordinance’ to work effectively together. Glimpsed from the 
outside, the Cameron-Clegg relationship does not seem combative with both recognising 
that their political and personal relationship is key to the coalition surviving (and 
thriving). The Cameron-Clegg relationship ‘sets the tone for government at every level’ 
(Laws 2010: 275) and both have, so far, seemingly enjoyed a convivial and trusting 
relationship. 
  
Informality and personal warmth may have come easily to two forty-something year old 
leaders sharing similar educational backgrounds, but personal relationships, important as 
they are, need to be understood within the context of institutional arrangements. 
Exploring the relationship between the prime minister and a formalised deputy prime 
minister, especially one drawn from another party, requires us to enter unchartered 
territory. The role played by, say, the US vice president might change according to the 
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relationship a vice president has with his or her particular president, but the holder of the 
post is elected as part of a presidential ticket, holds a constitutionally mandated office and 
will, should the president resign, be impeached or become permanently incapacitated, 
automatically succeed to the presidency. No constitutional or political rights or any 
formal responsibilities are automatically conferred upon the British deputy prime 
minister. The ‘post’ exists only in reworked convention. It has previously been a courtesy 
title provided by the prime minister to indicate a minister’s standing and seniority; recent 
examples include William Whitelaw in 1979-88, Geoffrey Howe in 1989-90, Michael 
Heseltine in 1995-97 and John Prescott in 1997-2007. Howe was given the title (but not 
the requisite status) only by being demoted from foreign secretary; Tony Blair awarded 
Prescott the title merely to keep him ‘sweet’ and because he felt Prescott’s party status, 
being Labour’s deputy leader, ‘required’ it; Gordon Brown felt no such compulsion to 
similarly reward his party deputy Harriet Harman rewarding instead the minister he most 
relied upon, Peter Mandelson, with the title of first secretary of state.  
 
Under Clegg the position of deputy prime minister has now been formalised (if 
temporarily so). Clegg holds not only a title but a cabinet position with certain powers. 
His position in the government- and those of other Liberal Democrat ministers- is not 
something prime minister Cameron can change; this deputy prime minister, unlike other 
holders of the post since 1945, cannot be reshuffled or removed. This is, to say the least, 
unusual. Nothing of its like has been seen since Churchill’s wartime coalition when the 
Labour leader, Clement Attlee, held the same post and sat of right in Churchill’s cabinet. 
Cameron and Clegg’s relationship, while it brings advantages to both (Cameron, being 
unwilling to lead a minority government, might not be prime minister without Clegg’s 
party), may be presently one of convenience, not of conviction, but it remains the 
mainstay both of Cameron’s coalition government and his premiership.  
 
Making ministers and allocating portfolios  
 
The Cabinet Office document, Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, published 
in May 2010, establishes that ministerial posts are allocated “in proportion to the 
parliamentary representation of the two coalition parties” and that the “prime minister 
will make nominations for the appointment of ministers following consultation with the 
Deputy Prime Minister” (Cabinet Office 2010). Thus Cameron has formally and 
substantively limited his prime ministerial prerogative to make ministerial appointments. 
He still, naturally, nominates Conservative ministers, but Clegg now nominate s the 
agreed number of Liberal Democrat ministers. The Liberal Democrats have some five 
seats in cabinet and twenty-four other ministerial posts. The crucial allocation of 
portfolios, being left to bilateral negotiations between Cameron and Clegg, was not part 
of the coalition negotiations. Only three departments are run by Liberal Democrats 
(Business, where Vince Cable has left major work on universities to David Willetts; 
Energy and Climate Change and the post-devolution rather unsubstantial Scottish office). 
They control none of the big spending department; have no ministers in three major 
departments; and have to rely on junior ministers to be the Liberal Democrat voice in 
most departments (Paun 2010). 
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Not only has Clegg to agree to “changes to the allocation of portfolios between the 
parliamentary parties during the lifetime of the coalition”, but Cameron has also to accept 
that “no Liberal Democrat minister or whip may be removed on the recommendation of 
the prime minister without full consultation with the deputy prime minister” (Cabinet 
Office 2010). This second requirement, in light of the fallout from business secretary 
Vince Cable’s unwise and vain boast that he was ‘waging war’ against Rupert Murdoch 
(when Cable, unusually, was not fired, but responsibility for media regulation was 
transferred from his department to the Department for Culture Media and Sport 
(DCMS)), suggests Clegg has the practical power - in consultation with Cameron - to 
defend ‘his’ ministers. Cameron’s powers of appointment have been limited by his 
coalition: Cable would surely have been fired had he been a Conservative. Cameron and 
Clegg together took the decision to keep him on; this is because his position within the 
cabinet (if not necessarily the portfolio he holds) is in the gift of Clegg, not Cameron. 
Both reached the compromise: first, hiving off media competition policy to the DCMS; 
second, keeping a chastened (and considerably weakened) Cable within the cabinet. The 
fact that Cable again retained his place in cabinet when subsequently criticising Cameron 
for being ‘very unwise’ in referring to the social problems caused by mass immigration, 
indicates the changed circumstances brought about under the coalition. Any minister 
referring to the prime minister of a single party government in such terms would surely 
have been fired; if not fired, such a minister would certainly have felt honour bound to 
resign.  
The coalition, in order to maintain the agreed ministerial balance between the two 
partners, has also agreed to operate by a ‘one-in, one-out’ rule. For instance, when the 
Liberal Democrat David Laws resigned from the cabinet, he was replaced by the 
reshuffled Danny Alexander (who was then replaced by the promoted Michael Moore); 
When Liam Fox was forced to resign, having run a coach and horse through the 
ministerial code, his place in cabinet was ultimately taken by a promoted Tory, Justine 
Greening. The prime ministerial power of patronage has long been the essential resource 
binding ministers (and, crucially, would-be ministers and want-to-be-more-senior 
ministers) to him or her. Cameron, by having not only to consult- but also to ‘agree’- with 
Clegg on ministerial appointments and portfolio allocation, has had this power 
significantly constrained by a new formal limitation. Having to manage the coalition 
might help explain why Cameron, in contrast to his predecessors, has been noticeably 
reluctant to reshuffle his ministerial team. Clegg of course cannot influence Cameron’s 
right to choose the Conservative members of the government. Both principals, we can 
assume, respect each other’s right to freely choose which members of their respective 
parties are to be in the government (and at what level in which post). Any practical 
restraint on their use of that unequally shared prerogative (Cameron nominates more 
ministers than Clegg) will be exerted by what their respective parties deem bearable, not 
by Cameron, nor by Clegg. 
Cabinet and its committees 
 
It is well established that the full cabinet no longer plays any serious, meaningful role as 
a deliberative body charged with taking decisions (as opposed to the occasional collective 
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discussion and, more importantly, the endorsement of the policy agenda of senior 
ministers) (Marsh, Richards and Smith 2001; Smith 1999; Heffernan 2005a; Runciman 
2004). Cabinet is merely reported to by key principals but can, occasionally, provide a 
sounding board from which key strategists, foremost among them the prime minister, can 
bounce off ideas and seek advice. The coalition cabinet mood music was genial from the 
start, as one would expect from a new government, with Cameron considering himself 
the coalition’s ‘chairman’ (Parker 2011). The contrast with the Blair and Brown cabinets 
was evident. Not only would Cameron have to operate a more collective cabinet system 
by coalition necessity, but the lack of obvious leadership rivals meant a more convivial 
atmosphere. Clegg sits opposite Cameron in cabinet meetings, in the seat from where 
Brown eyed Blair. He has George Osborne on his right and Ken Clarke on his left (Laws 
2010). Cameron is known to let discussion flow around the cabinet table and there are 
signs that the cabinet occasionally engages in discussion of an issue and some ministers 
show a willingness to assert themselves beyond their brief. Cabinet deals, brokered, if 
needs be, by Cameron and Clegg, have been struck. Generally, however, coalition 
ministers have surprisingly been on the same page; Cameron is reported to have 
remarked: 'I get far more trouble from Ken Clarke, Liam Fox and Iain Duncan Smith than 
I do from Nick’ (Rawnsley 2010a).  
 
We are thus led to believe that the full cabinet matters more under the coalition, creating 
the impression of a revival of cabinet and its committees (Hazell and Yong 2011). But the 
exchange of cabinet opinion is not the same as the taking of a substantive decision on a 
subject. As the coalition has entered choppier waters differences between ministers have 
become apparent, although the policy disagreements that have leaked in recent times 
often centre on tensions in the Conservative camp (most glaringly between Cameron and 
Liam Fox on the Strategic Defence and Security Review, Michael Gove and William 
Hague on Britain’s response to the Libyan uprising, and between Ken Clarke and Theresa 
May both on sentencing and the impact of the Human Rights Act). Only on Lansley’s 
NHS reforms have the parties, having publicly disagreed, had subsequently to seek 
compromise; both, having opposed views, have postponed consideration of the Human 
Rights Act for the remainder of this parliament. It is worth noting, however, that under 
both Blair and Brown cabinet discussions (such as they were) were largely confined to 
minsters asking (some) questions of the prime minister or of the relevant minister 
responsible for the issue at hand. Rarely did ministers engage with each other over 
matters relating to a particular minister’s brief. Cameron’s cabinet meetings have 
sometimes seen ministers engage with one another (notably over the case for a Libyan no 
fly zone, NHS reformand criminal justice policy), but the long established bilateral 
dynamic of the prime minister being the ‘centre’ and other ministers being the ‘spokes’ 
remains in place, even if Clegg plays a far more central role than previous holders of his 
post (Heffernan 2003, 2005a; Blick and Jones 2010). 
  
‘Coalitionising’ policy 
   
Cabinet, for some time now, has largely worked though its committees (Lawson 1994; 
Hennessy 2005; Helms 2005). This has not changed under Cameron. However a leaner 
cabinet committee system was established; one with the bite to process decisions on key 
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issues. Coalition government means government by committee, but cabinet committee 
meetings on important matters have usually been preceded by meetings of the key 
principals led by Cameron and Clegg or their surrogates (Hazell and Yong 2011). 
Cameron and Clegg transact most of their business through regular and formal bilateral 
meetings (at least once a week on Monday mornings) and by holding numerous private 
conversations, but the coalition has then to work through various ministerial and official, 
formal and informal committees.  
 
The formal cabinet structures put in place in the Coalition Agreement establish a 
‘coalition committee’ at the ‘top of the government’s collective decision-making 
machinery’ (Paun 2010). Cameron and Clegg co-chair this committee which has “to 
manage the business and priorities of the Government and the implementation and 
operation of the coalition agreement” (Cabinet Office 2010a). It contains five 
Conservatives and five Liberal Democrats, including the most senior figures of each of 
the parties, and is charged with keeping the coalition on track when times get tough. 
Unresolved issues are expected to be referred to the coalition committee, but ‘the use of 
this right will be kept to a minimum’ (ibid). Referral to the coalition committee is thus a 
last resort when other committees- and Cameron- Clegg communications- fail to solve 
the matter. It is listed as meeting weekly, but ‘[i]n its first three months of existence it has 
apparently met just once, to resolve issues relating to the plans for structural reform of the 
NHS and the proposed boundary review for House of Commons constituencies’ (Hazell 
and Yong 2011). As a rule conflicts are resolved informally and mostly amicably, 
without formal reference to the coalition committee, something that indicates that other 
cabinet arrangements to resolve problems and potential conflicts between the coalition 
partners work well. It also demonstrates that ministers have, so far, established smooth 
and harmonious ways of working that have not needed the formal intervention of the 
‘court of last resort’, the coalition committee.  
 
Cabinet committees have a chair from one party and a deputy chair from the other. Either 
the chair or deputy chair of a committee has the right to refer irresolvable policy 
disagreements to the coalition committee. Among other important committees are the 
National Security Council (on which Clegg sits as Deputy Chair) and the Home Affairs 
Committee (chaired by Clegg, without Cameron’s direct involvement) which has a broad 
remit covering constitutional, education, health, welfare and immigration issues. In 
addition there is a ‘Coalition Operation and Strategic Planning Group’, which comprises 
the Conservatives Oliver Letwin and Francis Maude and the Liberal Democrats Danny 
Alexander, and Jim Wallace. This, it was assumed, would informally troubleshoot issues 
beneath the attention of a formal committee or meetings of Cameron and Clegg, but it has 
hardly met because such issues are dealt with more informally between the key players 
(Hazell and Yong 2011). 
 
Given the need for Conservative and Liberal Democrat ministers to have some form of 
‘ownership’ of a policy, the cabinet system has to matter more than has been the case 
under past single party governments. For the coalition to work effectively it certainly 
requires a degree of collective discussion of key issues in cabinet committees, if not in 
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cabinet, to ensure comity between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. For Cameron’s 
first cabinet secretary, Gus O’Donnell, this means a  
 
…completely different way of working. And that’s because, as civil servants, we 
have put across the message that whenever a policy decision comes up we need to 
coalitionise (sic) it. That means very early on, it works across both political 
parties (O’Donnell 2011).  
 
Of course ensuring each party works off the same page and can claim ownership of 
important policy issues need not imply a return to older school notions of collective 
cabinet or ministerial government, the practice called into question by both Blair and 
Margaret Thatcher. 
 
Cameron as predominant prime minister? 
 
The notion that the prime minister should be powerful and authoritative- that any party 
leader, to be successful, has to be powerful and authoritative- is now a central feature of 
British politics. This is because two trends in comparative party politics have further 
rooted a leader-centric imperative within British politics: First the ongoing 
personalisation of politics places party leaders ever more centre stage, something 
prompted by the pathologies of news media reportage. Second, the ongoing decline in the 
electorate’s ties to parties, which makes parties ‘sell’ themselves by emphasising their 
leadership and the policy presented by that leadership (Katz and Mair 2002; Panebianco 
1988; Heffernan 2009). This means that each prime minister has a large political 
footprint. Elections are increasingly fought out between parties led by their leaders, so 
parties have significantly increased the political purchase of the individual party leader 
over their programme and campaign pitch (ibid). This contributes to the power of the 
prime minister in government (and to that of the deputy prime minister). As the televised 
party leader’s debates at the 2010 election portend, the political purchase of the party 
leader is likely to increase, not decrease in the future. Cameron and Clegg both cast 
considerable shadows over their respective parties, but Cameron’s is presently the larger. 
 
Parties have always had a pyramidal structure, but now more than ever they reflect a 
strict parliamentary hierarchy of (1) leader; (2) other senior leaders; (3) frontbenchers; 
and (4) backbenchers. This reinforces the long established centrality of the prime minister 
as it is now assumed he or she will be more than ‘primus inter pares’ and have more 
authority, influence and power than other governmental actors. ‘Weaker’ prime ministers 
like Gordon Brown are unfavourably contrasted to more ‘powerful’ prime ministers such 
as Tony Blair; Cameron has long eagerly aspired to being in the Blair mould. Being 
powerful, though, never makes any prime minister a ‘president’ when the notion of 
presidentialisation (Foley 2000) was forever undone by the confirmation in recent 
ministerial (and prime ministerial) memoirs that infighting between Blair and Brown 
meant Brown regularly prevented Blair from pursuing his chosen agenda (Blair 2010; 
Mandelson 2010). No US president, unlike the British prime minister, can use a partisan 
majority to successfully lead their legislature; but no prime minister, as Brown proved 
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under the supposedly ‘president’ Blair, can ever have the total control the president has 
over his or her executive (Heffernan 2005).  
 
Cameron, having been a powerful and authoritative party leader in opposition, is eager to 
cast himself in the modern mould of leadership. Even friendly admirers consider him 
"ambitious, competitive, there's an element of selfishness, all the things which are 
important if you're going to be Prime Minister. Ruthless. He's got all of those….. David is 
a natural No. 1" (Mayer 2008). Cameron, being prime minister, has automatic possession 
of the following four institutional power resources.   
 
1. Being the legal head of the government, having the right of proposal and veto, to 
appoint and delegate responsibilities to ministers and departments through the use of 
Crown prerogatives, and having the right to be consulted, either directly or indirectly, 
about all significant matters relating to government policy;  
2. Helping set the policy agenda through leadership of the government, bilateral 
negotiations with individual ministers, management of the cabinet and cabinet 
committee system and directing the Whitehall apparatus;  
3. Heading up a de facto prime ministerial department in Downing Street and the 
Cabinet Office; and  
4. Being able, through his or her party and the news media, to set the government’s 
political agenda (Heffernan 2003).  
 
These resources make any prime minister, even when leading a coalition, a unique, 
powerful Whitehall actor. Cameron, as with all prime ministers, will be a predominant 
prime minister (the ‘stronger or main element’ within the party, parliament and 
government), when able to marry his prime ministerial institutional power with the 
following personal power resources: 
 
1. Reputation, skill and ability; 
2. Association with actual or anticipated political success; 
3. Electoral popularity; and 
4. Having a high standing in his or her parliamentary party (less so the extra-
parliamentary party) (Heffernan ibid) 
 
These resources empower the prime minister within both their party and government. 
Within parliament the ability to lead a partisan Commons majority (even if one provided 
by a coalition) confers considerably advantage; within the government ministers, 
whatever their career trajectory, are more likely to work to or otherwise defer to a prime 
minister who is electorally popular and they consider politically successful. This gives 
the prime minister a less fettered hand in the running of their government. Blair, in his 
pre 2003 heyday, possessed such power resources in abundance (Seldon 2007, 2004; for 
the authors takes on this see Bennister 2009; Heffernan 2007). He was, notwithstanding 
Gordon Brown’s ability to often stymie him in many policy areas, mostly predominant as 
a result.  
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Prime ministers find that their political ‘skill in context’ is crucial to their utilisation of 
resources, because these prime ministerial personal resources are contingent and 
contextual; they come and go, are acquired and squandered, won and lost. Cameron, like 
all prime ministers, will be predominant by being well resourced; he will be less 
predominant by being poorly resourced. Cameron might model his personal style on 
Blair, but he has to be aware that the former Labour leader could largely play loose with 
his party because (1) he was considerably bolstered by having led Labour to substantial 
parliamentary majorities and (2) he was, before 2004, personally popular with Labour 
voters and with MPs. Cameron, while being personally popular, can make no such similar 
claims of having ‘won’ an election or of having brought substantial electoral advantage to 
the Conservatives. He will also know that Conservative MPs have in the past been more 
amenable to regicide (or attempted regicide) than the often more compliant parliamentary 
Labour party. 
 
Is Cameron constrained by Clegg? 
 
Cameron, like any prime minister, is constrained by public and parliamentary opinion, 
the temporality of their power resources, the obligations of collegiality, and by limitations 
such as time, information and expertise. Cameron’s opportunity to be a powerful and 
authoritative prime minister is, unusually, unusually constrained by his relationship with 
Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats. Prime Minister Cameron is powerful, by simple 
virtue of occupying the office, but within the coalition he has to:  
 
1. Make policy compromises with his coalition partner, rather than pull his own party 
behind his own favoured policy agenda;  
2. Negotiate the peculiarities of having to manage the ‘two-headed leadership’ of the 
government;  
3. Accept that there are constraints on his ability to appoint and manage ministers who 
are not of his own party; and  
4. Acknowledge, because the government has to operate not only intra-party, but also 
cross-party, that there is a new collective dynamic within the executive and 
specifically inside the cabinet system.  
 
This reality, so far, has proven to be something to which Cameron has been able 
(happily) to accommodate himself to. His abovementioned personal power resources (his 
failure to win the election for the Conservatives or to subsequently improve on their 
electoral showing notwithstanding) are presently more in credit than debit, as 
demonstrated by his strong personal polling. His institutional power resources, however, 
are partially compromised by his leading a coalition and by his relationship with Clegg. 
Cameron remains the legal head of the government, but his prerogatives to propose, veto 
and make ministerial appointments are, as we have seen, constrained by Clegg. Clegg, 
having a party based autonomy from Cameron, plays some part in structuring the policy 
agenda through leadership of the government, bilateral negotiations with individual 
ministers, management of the cabinet and cabinet committee system and exerting 
influence over the Whitehall apparatus. This policy agenda has already been structured to 
a considerable extent by the Coalition Programme for Government. Cameron’s ability to 
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be able, through his or her party and the news media, to set the government’s political 
agenda is also partially fettered by Clegg’s ability - and that of ‘his’ ministers- to try to 
do likewise as Liberal Democrats.  
 
These constraints are a subtle qualification of the prime minister’s institutional power. 
Can Clegg, short of the radical step of pulling the plug on the coalition, further constrain 
Cameron? Not really. Clegg’s powers are often informal. He is Lord President of the 
Council, a post usually held by the Leader of the House of Commons or Lords but, 
beyond the Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, little other formal light is cast 
on his role. He has (1) Privy Council responsibilities; (2) heads up the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister; (3) is responsible for the Cabinet Office’s Political and 
Constitutional Directorate; (4) fills in for Cameron at prime minister’s questions and (5) 
‘runs’ the routine, mundane business of government in Cameron’s absence. As deputy 
prime minister, Clegg presently possesses, then, the following institutional power 
resources: 
 
1. The ability to collapse the government (with the agreement of Liberal Democrat MPs) 
by withdrawing Liberal Democrat support from the coalition;  
2. As Cameron’s deputy he possesses the right to be consulted on ministerial 
appointments and can nominate, following consultation with Cameron, Liberal 
Democrat ministers; he has the right to propose (and perhaps veto) policy and, with 
other Liberal Democrat ministers, to amend policy; to stand in for the prime minister 
in his absence; and having the right to be consulted, either directly or indirectly, about 
all significant matters relating to government policy;  
3. Helping set the policy agenda through bilateral negotiations with the prime minister; 
chairing of cabinet committees; and having the right to see and comment on 
departmental papers presented to the prime minister; and 
4. Making use of a new, but limited (if expanding), deputy prime minister’s office.  
 
These resources, while more significant than those of any other minister, are weaker than 
those of the prime minister. In essence they enable Clegg to qualify Cameron’s 
institutional power resources, rather than provide him with the means to pursue his own 
separate agenda. Clegg manages the government’s constitutional reform agenda, but 
without a full department of his own, he is unusual by comparison with other 
comparative deputies (Paun 2010). He may have weakened his position by avoiding 
taking a major portfolio, but it is hard to see that Cameron could have made him foreign 
secretary and he is likely to have turned down the graveyard post of home secretary 
(being chancellor, George Osborne’s non-negotiable perch, was, naturally, out of the 
question). The realities of coalition government necessitates Clegg’s location close to the 
action with a strong domestic focus; only by lacking a strict departmental role can he 
hope to play some role across the range of government policy.  
 
The limitations of Clegg’s personal power resources 
 
Clegg’s principal resource, his trump card, is that the Coalition Agreement indicates that 
both prime minister and deputy prime minister ‘should’ have a ‘full and 
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contemporaneous overview of the business of Government. Each will have the power to 
commission papers from the Cabinet Secretariat’ (Cabinet Office 2010). The devil, as  
ever, is in the detail: the operative word there, one notes, is ‘should’. The prime minister 
has the greater institutional resource to enjoy such a ‘full and contemporaneous 
overview’ than those possessed by Clegg’s (newly established) office. There is “an 
inherent asymmetry in the coalition — in numbers, resources, experience and 
preparation” (Riddell 2010). By July 2011 Cameron had appointed some 20 Downing 
Street special advisers and Clegg had 5 (Hansard 2011). Clegg can draw on civil service 
resources but his office “remains under-resourced and overstretched. Initially it was 
inadequately staffed…… [It] is now much bigger than a Secretary of State’s office, but 
the staff are more junior and inexperienced in comparison with those in No 10” (Hazell 
and Yong 2011). Clegg then, while better resourced than before, remains, however, 
considerably outnumbered and out resourced having ‘to cover ninety per cent of the 
policy remit of the Prime Minister with less than half the support’ (Paun 2010). Team 
Cameron might have brought “Liberal Democrat advisers into the heart of Number 10” 
(Seldon 2011), but while, as Seldon suggests, Clegg can make use of Downing Street 
resources, it remains unclear whether he can only draw on such resources for 
informational purposes, rather than being able himself to marshal and direct them. 
Locating himself at the centre may have been a strategic decision, but it has meant Clegg 
lacks the necessary resources to fulfil the coordinating role he had envisaged. He has also 
badly missed the advice of the absent David Laws, who left the cabinet following his 
failure to properly account for his parliamentary expenses. Laws’ role as Clegg’s 
‘deputy’ has since been filled by the much less effective Danny Alexander (and 
Alexander, assumedly, has a full time job in the Treasury). Cameron remains the 
resource-rich actor in the executive; he has 175 staff at his disposal in the prime 
minister’s office in contrast to Clegg’s 13 in the office of the deputy prime minister (plus 
the 60 officials of the Constitutional and Political Reform Directorate)  (Cabinet Office 
2010b). 
 
We may thus be able to identify a set of institutional resources for Clegg as the deputy 
prime minister, but Clegg can only be practically empowered within the executive should 
he be able to lay meaningful claim to the same personal resources as those of the prime 
minister: 
 
1. Reputation, skill and ability; 
2. Association with actual or anticipated political success; 
3. Electoral popularity; and 
4. Having a high standing in his or her parliamentary party (less so the extra-
parliamentary party) (Heffernan 2003, 2005a). 
 
Clegg presently struggles to possess (let alone effectively use) these four resources. He 
retains the fourth resource at present, but since entering government he has been 
considerably weakened in the others by being hit hard by (1) the Liberal Democrat slump 
in the polls; (2) losing the Oldham East and Saddleworth and Barnsley by-elections; (3) 
taking the blame for ‘Tory measures’ such as the cuts and the hike in tuition fees; and (4) 
by enduring considerable liberal (small l) hostility born of ‘his’ decision to ‘prop up’ a 
 12 
Conservative government, something reflected in the dramatic collapse of the Liberal 
Democrats poll ratings. This was reinforced in May 2011 by disastrous results in the local 
and devolved elections in May 2011 and by the resounding rejection of the Liberal 
Democrat’s cherished electoral reform at the referendum. Cameron has been criticised by 
Liberal Democrats for letting Clegg take the flak for breaking his party’s promise on 
tuition fees, but Clegg, it would seem, has been more than prepared to take such flak and 
Cameron has further irritated some Liberal Democrats (notably Energy secretary Chris 
Huhne) when intervening to shore up the ‘No’ campaign in the AV referendum (even if 
Huhne’s long term target is more likely to have been his own party leader). Clegg’s 
problems are exacerbated by the irresolvable conundrum that he can (1) only operate in 
Whitehall (and extract policy concessions from Cameron) by being emollient and 
consensual, but (2) can only secure electoral credit from past Liberal Democrat voters by 
being assertive and confrontational. Having to balance both realities has seen Clegg 
assert a claim of ‘muscular liberalism’ since May 2011 (Clegg 2011) and his party 
engage in rhetorical Tory bashing at its conference in September  
 
Clegg’s weakness, then, is that many Liberal Democrat voters think the Conservative 
brand has not been ’sufficiently decontaminated’. The few concessions(or policy 
victories he might achieve within the cabinet system, and from Cameron) often remain 
out of sight of the electorate or are of a technical nature of interest only to the political 
cognoscenti. Clegg and other Liberal Democrat ministers cannot, for reasons of cabinet 
comity and their need to maintain the relationship between Cameron and Clegg and 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat ministers, too often ‘run’ against ‘their’ government. 
Neither can they ‘challenge the ‘Conservatives’ or only trumpet their own party successes 
by distinguishing them from those of the government. Cameron, then, might find himself 
having to support and explain government policy not of his party’s own making (the 
policy of Liberal Democrat ministers), but Clegg has the more unenviable task of 
explaining and defending Conservative policy to non-Conservative voters. This helps 
explain why Cameron’s personal approval rating has hovered around 40 percent after the 
post-election high of 60 percent, but Clegg’s plummeted from a similarly post-election 
high level to a 20 percent approval rating. A year into the coalition his party found itself 
polling an all time low of some 9 percent (YouGov 2011). George Osborne, asked why 
his prophecy about becoming Britain’s public enemy number one has not yet 
materialised, joked with colleagues: “I hadn’t reckoned on Nick Clegg” (Parker 2011a). 
So far the Conservatives, it seems, receive whatever credit is given the coalition and the 
Liberal Democrats much of the blame. 
Cameron, while having to make concessions to and work with Clegg, remains a  
predominant prime minister 
Clegg, short of the doomsday scenario of collapsing the coalition (or threatening to do 
so), can only significantly qualify the prime minister’s institutional power, not 
permanently erode it. Any threat he might make to end the coalition cannot be made idly 
and can probably never be made more than once. The shift to fixed term parliaments, 
while appearing to limit the prime minister’s prerogative power to dissolve parliament 
and use the advantage of incumbency, may well more tightly bind the coalition together 
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until 2015 and so strengthen Cameron’s hand. Is Cameron predominant? Among 
Conservatives he is presently unchallenged. He has, for instance, no equivalent of 
Gordon Brown to contend with; something placing him in a more advantageous intra-
executive position than Tony Blair; George Osborne, Cameron’s chancellor, is his closest 
supporter, not a Brown-like scheming successor. Unlike the weaker Gordon Brown, 
Cameron’s command of his party is such he would be wholly predominant were it not for 
the policy concessions he had to make to Clegg and his coalition partner. Such 
concessions, however, appear to be easily made by Cameron who seems not remotely 
concerned to be unable to pursue the entire policy agenda Conservatives (and especially 
the Conservative right) might favour. He is, then, in spite of Clegg, more predominant 
than not; he is, however, less predominant than he would be were he leading a single 
party government. Naturally, Cameron, like all prime ministers, probably thinks he is 
neither powerful nor sufficiently predominant. 
Has Cameron restored some semblance of collegial government? 
 
Initial reading of Cameron’s style saw some commentators, such as Fraser Nelson, claim 
that ministers were now more trusted by the prime minister and that  
 
…[t]he old days – where Number 10 and the Treasury tried to pull the strings of 
government and treated Cabinet members like puppets – are over…. Number 10 
does not try to control everything, the Chancellor no longer seeks to stop 
everything. The whole government is of a fundamentally different character…… 
Cameron has found ministers he trusts, and asked them to get on with it. It's called 
Cabinet government, and it was the norm until 1997. It has just made a comeback. 
Ministerial initiatives (police reform, health reform, welfare reform, school 
reform) are welcomed, not crushed, by a Prime Minister and a Chancellor who 
have a shared objective (Nelson 2010). 
 
There is, given the need to coalitionise policy and to engage both sets of parties in 
decision making, a greater degree of cabinet collegiality than under Labour. Of course 
prime ministerial- led bilateralism, even when tempered by the involvement of the deputy 
prime minister, is not prime ministerial diktat, but neither is it a form of old school 
cabinet government (Heffernan 2005a; March Richards and Smith 2001; Blick and Jones 
2010).  
 
Cabinet collegiality, certainly in the form misattributed to the supposed ‘golden age’ 
when ministers submitted papers on subjects beyond their departmental brief and cabinet 
met for hour on end debating- with a vote taken- the pressing issues of the day, remains a 
thing of the past. Cameron’s full cabinet remains, as argued above, largely a forum for 
the exchange of information. Committee deliberation is inevitably shaped beforehand by 
bilateral negotiations led by the prime minister in which Liberal Democrat ministers, 
especially Clegg, have a greater autonomy than their Conservative counterpart but in 
which Cameron and Osborne have considerable authority. Cameron, appearing before the 
Commons Liaison Committee, insisted that the process in setting the strategy for the 
Comprehensive Spending Review was ‘more collegiate and collective than it has been in 
 14 
the past’. But the pre-cooked nature of the negotiations was shaped by ‘quadrilateral 
meetings’ of Cameron, Clegg, Osborne and Alexander….. before nine discussions in 
Cabinet on the Comprehensive Spending Review’(Liaison Committee 2010). Regular 
meetings of this ‘quad’, which consists of Cameron, Osborne, Clegg and Danny 
Alexander, are a key feature of the coalition because they enable both principals and their 
primary advisors to troubleshoot issues and try to ensure both parties operate on the same 
page. Importantly, as Hazell and Yong note, this has come to form part of an established 
informal process within the coalition (Hazell and Yong 2011). 
 
Cameron’s management of the Conservative party has long exhibited Blair-like inner 
circle tendencies (Heffernan 2010; Bale 2010; Snowden 2010). In government we see 
that the aforementioned ‘quad’, while it includes the key Liberal Democrats, is an 
‘exclusive’ meeting, not an ‘inclusive’ one. In opposition Cameron’s style of policy 
making was not remotely collegiate in the sense that shadow ministers were able to 
collectively decide policy or strategy. It was only collegial in that shadow ministers 
conferred with Cameron and Osborne. This is still the case in government for the 
Conservative side of the coalition. It is, however, less so for the Liberal Democrat side 
where Clegg, speaking on behalf of ‘his’ ministers can make their case to Cameron. Of 
course, the weaker electorally or the less successful Clegg and his party are seen to be, 
the weaker he and it will be within the government. Liberal Democrats, faced with 
wretched poll ratings, are likely to have to cling to their Conservative nurse for fear of 
something worse. If Clegg is disempowered within government by being electorally 
unpopular his parliamentary party is not necessarily empowered (but can assert itself by 
putting the brakes on Conservative- led NHS reforms or when defending the Human 
Rights Act). The electorally weakened Liberal Democrats, barring any major unforeseen 
development, are in the coalition for the long haul. This means, provided Cameron is 
prepared to make the necessary compromises on policy that he can live with (and he is 
nothing but pragmatically flexible), that his potential to be predominant, his being more 
than primus inter pares, should be unaffected by his being prime minister in a coalition. 
Predominance, again, does not imply any form of prime ministerial ‘omnipotence’, but 
only the prime minister being the ‘stronger or main element’ within the party and the 
government. 
 
An ever more assertive centre? Back to the Blair model? 
 
Cameron has successfully presented himself as ‘prime ministerial’. He often excels when 
making his case via the news media, shines effortlessly in both public and semi-private 
arenas, and makes effective use of his parliamentary platform. Cameron’s approach to 
policy  as opposed to tactics and strategy) can, however, lack the necessary command of 
detail. He, and especially his team in No10, seems more prepared than most prime 
ministerial predecessors to delegate significant responsibility to ministers. The prime 
minister has, as a result, found himself charged with being behind the curve when 
problems arise in regard to such issues as the plan to privatize state owned forestry land, 
NHS reform and prison sentence reforms; he was recently reproached for being reactive 
when responding to the recent London riots. As a result Cameron, stung by the criticism 
that he responds only when assertive complaints about policy are made by Liberal 
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Democrat or Tory backbenchers, has recently sought to bolster the institutional grasp 
across Whitehall that is afforded him by No10. 
 
Under Blair individuals mattered more than the formal positions they held. Trusted 
advisers had the prime minister’s ear and resources were directed towards 
communications and trying to ensure that Blair’s ‘writ’ ran throughout Whitehall (Seldon 
2007; 2004). That Cameron has slowly moved back to the Blair model is obvious not 
only with his long standing dependence on special advisers such as Ed Llewellyn, Kate 
Fall, Steve Hilton, Andy Coulson and Andrew Cooper but in his communications 
operation, now led by Craig Oliver. It is very much in the mould of both Gordon Brown’s 
communications team and of Blair’s operation post Alastair Campbell. The loss of 
Coulson to the phone hacking scandal was a personal blow to Cameron, who was 
convinced that to manage the media you needed an experienced media operator at the 
centre. Cameron’s private office similarly follows the Blair blueprint, being jointly led by 
a special adviser, Llewellyn, who is Chief of Staff, working alongside the seemingly 
indispensible Downing Street permanent secretary, Jeremy Heywood. The Number 10 
Policy Unit has undergone three evolutions since May 2010 to become an ‘integrated unit 
staffed by 12 civil servants head hunted and interview by both Cameron and Clegg. The 
Unit is led by officials, Paul Kirby and Kris Murrin, with a remit to ‘depoliticise analysis 
of policy’ (Hazell and Yong 2011; Montgomerie 2011a). An early tendency for 
‘departmentalism’ has already appeared to have run its course. As Tom Kelly, Blair's 
press spokesperson and a former civil servant, notes: “it’s all very well saying 
departments should do their own thing but in the end everything comes through the front 
and back doors of No10 and there is no alternative to a strong grip from the centre” 
(Daily Telegraph 2011a). Continuity is evident in the civil service with both Heywood 
and cabinet secretary Gus O’Donnell’s having enhanced roles in managing the central 
functions of government (and with Heywood named as his successor as cabinet 
secretary). O’Donnell’s higher profile enables him to try to reassert the civil service ethos 
in Whitehall by promoting the Cabinet Office as a crucial player in the coalition:  
 
I describe myself as the equidistant Cabinet Secretary between the two. From my 
office it is – and I’ve counted it – 50 paces to get to the Prime Minister’s office 
and 50 paces to get to the Deputy Prime Minister’s office. That’s a very nice 
balance to have (Daily Telegraph 2011).  
 
Cameron, being aware of the need to strengthen Downing Street to enable him to be more 
assertive across Whitehall, has perhaps tentatively moved slowly, but methodically 
toward aping Blair’s much criticised form of ‘sofa government’. His, however, is to be a 
much larger sofa with more people sitting on it: Clegg, obviously, has to be seated on 
said sofa and George Osborne, who is the most important Conservative beyond Cameron, 
permanently sprawls on it. Osborne who, as one ‘Downing Street insider’ has confirmed, 
is ‘David Cameron’s principal adviser’(Montgomerie 2011a; Parker 2011a), is in 
attendance at all key Downing Street strategy meetings. He is, in sharp contrast to 
Gordon Brown who endlessly sought to assert himself over Tony Blair, a chancellor 
eager to help and support his prime minister and is a key member of ‘Team Cameron’. 
Cameron and Osborne form the core of the Conservative inner circle and both convene 
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daily meetings in No 10 at 8.30 and 4.30 (Montgomerie 2011a; Seldon 2011). Presently 
cabinet (or rather its committees) matters more under Cameron than under Blair or 
Brown, but Cameron’s large sofa will surely be increasingly used to strategically steer the 
government, if not necessarily to second guess or micromanage departmental policy; 
Cameron, one suspects, might find himself tempted to use it to do both. The prime 
minister’s possession of a fully effective Policy Unit (or some variant on it) has long been 
the principal means by which Downing Street shadows and impacts policy making in 
specific strategic policy fields. It is no surprise that Cameron has finally seen the need to 
establish one (ibid); the surprise is that he thought he could manage without one for the 
first ten months of his premiership.   
 
Cameron and Clegg going forward 
 
Coalition government, in theory, implies a more inclusive and collective style of policy-
making and decision taking (Laver and Schofield 1998; Muller and Strom 2000; Laver 
and Budge 1992). Government, which remains hierarchical, has still to be steered and 
led; which falls, as ever, to the prime minister and his or her office. In this task, however, 
Cameron is assisted by Clegg. Clegg, to his certain discomfort, provides a useful ‘human 
shield’ for Cameron, drawing much of the public ire on spending cuts and as cover from 
Cameron’s right flank. Not only are Clegg’s personal power resources weak, but his 
party’s considerable electoral problems have made him much weaker than Cameron. 
Although he has bolstered his institutional resources (particularly with the appointment of 
Chris Wormald as his chief of staff in October 2010, so creating a Heywood/ Wormald 
Whitehall axis (Hazell and Yong 2011)), he is still hugely disadvantaged in comparison 
with Cameron. Cameron can still occupy the higher ground on international affairs and 
manage his more dominant public profile, being able to set the agenda of government. 
Without a department, Clegg has direct control over constitutional affairs only – an area 
of great occasional importance, but with minimal public salience. 
 
Cameron’s prime ministerial style continues to owe much to the fact that he thinks the 
party leader to be predominant and that the prime minister has to be predominant as well. 
Prime ministers have endlessly to fend off media scrutiny, work with intra-governmental 
rivals, manage their ministers and MPs, brush off the hostility of other parties and 
anticipate the reaction of the electorate. They necessarily work at being predominant. 
Some, like Gordon Brown, never quite manage it. Helping Clegg keep Liberal Democrats 
on board, especially when their poll ratings continue to tank, offers Cameron a 
formidable challenge. Clegg, however, is presently tied into the government, but so too is 
Cameron  tied into his coalition. Cameron has to work hard to retain Clegg’s trust and 
confidence because, should trust between the two falter, then Cameron would be weaken 
by the stability of his government being compromised. Both principals have thus to work 
with and through each other. So far, however, both seem part of the same solid team and 
relationships between the parties have proved surprisingly unproblematic. So far; because 
nothing in a coalition can be assumed. 
Within parliament Cameron faces a Conservative right which is keen to assertive itself 
over issues such as the repeal of the Human Rights Act and the European Union. Their 
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clout was evidenced in October 2011 by the 81 Commons rebels prepared to embarrass 
Cameron by calling for an EU referendum and the over forty MPs who’s threatened 
rebellion persuaded the government to alter its stance on knife crime. Many on the right, 
claiming to have been elected on the Conservative manifesto, not the Coalition 
Agreement, are prepared to flex what muscles they have  (Montgomerie 2011), but 
lacking any serious or substantive champions either within or without the cabinet, 
rightwing backbenchers presently offers no immediate threat to Cameron. Thus there may 
be, in the words of those “close to the prime minister……, ‘about 30 to 40 shits’ who will 
take any opportunity to have a pop at him” (Forsyth 2011), but this ought be a 
manageable number.  Conservative MPs can, however, embarrass, sometimes harry, 
Cameron and his ministers. Cameron has therefore to take care to manage- if not to 
placate- the right. He has, whenever possible, to try not to foster backbench discontent by 
creating unnecessary and avoidable grievance. The prime minister is eager, however, to 
lead his party as he chooses; his style of leadership reflects his belief that MPs should be 
seen to follow him (and his confidents), not he follow them (Heffernan 2010). 
Shoehorning the Conservatives into a coalition was an easy task, but Cameron will have 
to work to maintain that coalition should a critical mass of Conservative MPs become (1) 
unhappy at its policy direction and (2) critical of his high handed management of the 
party. 
Conclusion 
A prime minister heading up a coalition government, even as powerful a party leader as 
Cameron ought not to be as authoritative as a prime minister leading a single party 
government. But the power of the prime minister always owes much to his or her 
informal, personal power resources which enable him or her to make effective use of 
their institutional power resources. This remains so under the coalition as under single 
party government. Cameron, being electorally popular and politically successful, can be 
an authoritative, predominant prime minister when he willingly accepts the policy 
compromises required by the Conservative- Liberal Democrat partnership. Cameron and 
Conservative ministers might well embrace such policy compromises, but have to 
acknowledge that the Conservative parliamentary party might not always be content to 
permit him and them doing so. Because Cameron’s  position is ultimately reliant upon his 
own parliamentary party, he has always to take care to retain the support of the broad 
majority of Tory backbenchers:  He may face no present threat from the Conservative 
right, but he has to fear centrist backbenchers feeling pressurized by restless or unhappy 
Conservative voters. To be a predominant prime minister, Cameron feels he has to 
maintain his predominant party leadership; he will be considerably the weaker, should 
Tory MPs see him to be either electorally unpopular or politically unsuccessful. Having 
to work with and through Nick Clegg presents Cameron with the principal obstacle to his 
being predominant, but this is an obstacle he has mostly managed to so far circumvent. 
At this early stage in the Cameron premiership, then, we can broadly observe that no 
formal, substantial change in the role of prime minister has been enacted. Cameron’s 
predominance, by leading a coalition, is partially constrained by Clegg, but he 
considerably constrains Clegg. We would expect any future single party government to 
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enable a well resourced prime minister to revert to the ways of Thatcher and Blair. This 
prime minister, then, is predominant even when he is constrained in significant ways by 
the imperatives of coalition government. But being well resourced in terms of his powers, 
Cameron, if he is prepared to continue to accept the policy compromises coalition 
imposes, is presently no more constrained than a prime minister who is faced with a 
preeminent intra-party rival with a significant power base. 
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